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I. INTRODUCTION
On October 21, 1988, former president Ferdinand Marcos and his
wife, Imelda, were indicted in United States district court on fraud and
racketeering charges.1 The charges stemmed from allegedly illegal ac-
tivities engaged in while Marcos was President of the Philippines and
which continued subsequent to his arrival in the United States.' The
indictment charged that after they were granted asylum in the United
States in 1986, the Marcoses had violated a federal court order which
prohibited the transfer of assets. Specifically, the New York federal
grand jury charged that the Marcoses through their associates,
Bienvenido Tantoco, Sr., former Philippine ambassador to the Vatican,
and his wife, backdated documents purporting to show that certain
properties in New York had been transferred to Saudi financier Adnan
Khashoggi earlier than the date of the court order.3 Reagan Adminis-
tration officials stated that "there were no foreign policy considerations
to prevent the indictment."'
1. Marcus, U.S. Indicts Marcos in $100 Million Plot, The Washington Post, Oct.
22, 1988, at Al, col. 5.
2. The six count indictment alleges that Marcos and others extorted and embez-
zled millions of dollars from the Philippine government in a plan that involved bribes,
kick-backs, and gratuities. The cash and stocks they received were converted from Phil-
ippine pesos to U.S. dollars for investment in the United States. Id.
3. The Marcoses and others were also charged with engaging in the interstate
transport of stolen funds and art works. Id.
4. Id. The same week the indictment was handed down, the United States and the
Aquino government reached an agreement that allowed two military bases to continue
operations in the Philippines. Id.
(127)
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Foreign policy implications, however, were raised in the federal
district court that froze the Marcoses' assets in 1986.5 In Republic of
Philippines v. Marcos,6 the Second Circuit unanimously held that the
Republic was entitled to a preliminary injunction barring Marcos, his
wife, and several other defendants from transferring or encumbering
the New York properties despite the former president's act of state de-
fense. The court ruled that the defendants had not met their burden of
proof and had failed to show that defendants' acts were public acts to
which the act of state doctrine applied.7 Thus, the court never reached
the merits of the Marcoses' defense, although the legal criteria used to
evaluate the merits of the preliminary injunction expressly required
such an evaluation." A federal court in California had evaluated a simi-
lar request to freeze the former president's assets and concluded that
the act of state doctrine did indeed preclude the issuance of such an
order despite ostensible burden of proof problems. 9
The court's ruling in Marcos has not stopped Marcos from claim-
ing that "head-of-state immunity" still bars his prosecution in New
York on the charges raised by the grand jury. 10 Since the court's ac-
tions in Marcos are at the center of the Marcos indictment, a review
and analysis of the court's reasoning is instructive as to the uncertain-
ties that plague judicial action when the act of state defense is invoked.
Moreover, it provides a window to the future, indicating the potential
arguments and counter arguments that may characterize the current
litigation. The main question for review is a simple one, but it has im-
portant implications: To what extent can a former dictator be prose-
cuted in the United States for acts committed in a foreign country
under martial law or for acts that stem from such activities?
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
In 1986 the Republic of the Philippines filed suit to enjoin and
5. New York Land Co. v. Republic of the Philippines, 634 F. Supp. 279, 288
(S.D.N.Y. 1986), afd sub nom. Marcos v. Republic of the Philippines, 806 F.2d 344
(1986), cert. denied, 107 S.Ct. 2178 (1986).
6. 806 F.2d 344 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S.Ct. 2178 (1986). The original
complaint in this action, filed March 2, 1986, was filed with the Supreme Court of
New York, County of New York, prior to its removal to the United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York. 806 F.2d at 347.
7. Id. at 359
8. See infra notes 89-96 and accompanying notes.
9. Republic of Philippines v. Marcos, 818 F.2d 1473 (9th Cir. 1987).
10. Marcus, supra note 1; Cannon & Marcus, Indictment of Marcos Due Today,
The Washington Post, Oct. 21, 1988, at Al, col. 1.
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restrain the transfer, conveyance, or encumbrance of five properties in
and around New York City. 1 The complaint alleged that the proper-
ties had been purchased with assets stolen from the people and Govern-
ment of the Philippines, and named the former President of the Philip-
pines, Ferdinand Marcos, and his wife as the principal defendants.12
Also named as defendants were the record holders of the properties and
their principals and managers, who were allegedly the nominees for
President and Mrs. Marcos.' 3
A temporary restraining order was issued when the action was
brought barring defendants from taking certain actions with respect to
the properties." Before a preliminary injunction could be granted, the
defendants, without President and Mrs. Marcos who had failed to ap-
pear, moved to vacate the order. 15 Defendants submitted no proofs in
opposition to the preliminary injunction but relied on the act of state
11. New York Land Co., 634 F. Supp. at 281. The properties included four New
York office buildings and a large mansion on Long Island. Id.
12. Id. The Washington Post described Marcos as follows:
A brilliant lawyer, shrewd politician and stirring orator, Marcos for years enjoyed
popularity and prestige at home and the friendship and praise of five American
presidents. He rose from power in 1965, promising social reforms in the former
U.S. colony, and was initially hailed as a new kind of Asian leader.
But over time he led an administration marked by corruption, graft, authori-
tarianism and stagnation. During his rule, Marcos kept his archipelago pro-Ameri-
can but also dismissed the legislature, imposed martial law for more than eight
years and jailed tens of thousands of opponents.
Human rights groups accused him of widespread abuses. A communist insur-
gency flourished, drawing support from peasants opposed to Marcos. His credibil-
ity suffered to such an extent that his own claims of being a World War II hero
was disputed.
His downfall came in the 1986 "people's power" revolt, after he called presi-
dential elections and then declared himself the winner despite independent tallies
showing Aquino as the real victor. Amid talks with U.S. officials and demands for
his removal by millions of ordinary citizens, Marcos and his family fled to live in
exile in Hawaii. They left behind stark reminders of their ostentatious life-style,
including Imelda Marcos' bulletproof boudoir with gold bathroom fixtures.
Richburg, Manila Supports Marcos Indictment, The Washington Post, Oct. 22, 1988,
at A 16, col. 4.
13. New York Land Co., 634 F. Supp. at 281. The defendants included the
Tantocos who were indicted with the Marcoses in New York. Marcus, supra note 1.
14. Id. The Philippine government stated a claim for relief under a theory of con-
structive trust and equitable lien. Marcos, 806 F.2d at 356. It was unclear whether a
United States court was to eventually try the fundamental issues of unlawful takings or
whether those issues would be tried in the Philippines. The appellate court stated that
"the district court may either itself determine ownership or defer to Philippine proceed-
ings, assuming they proceed with sufficient dispatch. Marcos, 344 F.2d at 356.
15. New York Land Co., 634 F. Supp. at 281.
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doctrine as a defense. 16 The district court conceded that the act of state
doctrine might eventually bar the suit,17 but concluded that in this in-
stance it could not block the issuance of an otherwise appropriate in-
junction.1 8 Personal acts of a sovereign, the court noted, were not pro-
tected by the act of state doctrine and defendants had not shown that
their acts were public acts. 9 The court further stated that it had re-
ceived no indication from the Department of State that the adjudica-
tion of the suit would embarrass the Executive in its conduct of foreign
policy." The preliminary injunction was granted."
The Second Circuit affirmed the decision on the grounds that ap-
pellants had not met their burden of proof and had failed to show that
the acts of Marcos were public acts, which could be protected under
the act of state doctrine. 2 The court stated that even if this burden was
met at a later date, the defense may still prove ineffectual because
Marcos no longer held power and the potential for interference in the
conduct of foreign policy was appreciably less than might otherwise
have existed.2 3 The court also noted that the act of state doctrine rested
on the respect for foreign states.24 Because the Government of the Phil-
ippines sought to try the suit in United States courts, respect for for-
eign states in this instance appeared to require the court to proceed
with the adjudication, not prohibit the action as the doctrine would re-
quire. Neither the district nor appellate court actually reached the mer-
its of the act of state defense, but the appellate court suggested that
these factors that leaned against applying the doctrine should be ex-
amined when and if public acts were shown to be at issue.2 5
16. In addition to the act of state defense, defendants relied on "the immunity of
President Marcos under Philippine law, the Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act of 1976,
28 U.S.C. Secs. 1602 et seq., the principle of forum non conveniens, and contention
that plaintiffis proofs are conjectural and insufficient." Id.
17. Id. at 289.
18. Id. at 290.
19. The court stated that personal acts could be protected if the acts of conversion
were done in the name of the foreign sovereign. Id. at 289.
20. The court also noted that defendants had not asserted that adjudication would
hinder foreign policy. Id.
21. Id. at 290.
22. The court asserted that even acts illegal under Philippine law could be pro-
tected under the doctrine. Id. at 359.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Without such an examination the court suggested that the district court
should consider deferring to a Philippine adjudication. Id.
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111. DEVELOPMENT OF THE ACT OF STATE DOCTRINE
The act of state doctrine26 has roots in the doctrine of sovereign
immunity. 7 Both are grounded on respect for a sovereign's right to
govern and attempt to eliminate legal confrontations between sover-
eigns."8 Yet, while the common law doctrine of sovereign immunity
could protect monarchs against suits in foreign countries, state officials
that exercised sovereign powers were not provided similar immunity."9
The judicially created act of state doctrine arose to protect these
individuals.30
The United States Supreme Court first acknowledged the act of
state doctrine as an independent source of immunity in Underhill v.
Hernandez.31 The suit involved a Venezuelan general who was accused
of assaulting a U.S. citizen in Venezuela. In dismissing the suit the
Court wrote "Every sovereign State is bound to respect the indepen-
dence of every other sovereign State, and the courts of one country will
not sit in judgment on the acts of the government of another done
within its own territory. '3 2 Today this statement is considered to ex-
press the essence of the act of state doctrine; s however, some commen-
tators view it as expanding the doctrine beyond its roots in sovereign
and personal immunity.' Specifically, they argue that the breadth of
26. Notable articles on the doctrine include: Henkin, Act of State Today: Recol-
lections in Tranquility, 6 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 175 (1967); Zander, The Act of
State Doctrine, 53 AM. J. INT'L L. 826 (1959); Bazyler, Abolishing the Act of State
Doctrine, 134 U. PA. L. REv., 325 (1986).
27. First National City Bank v. Banco Nacionale de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 762-63
(1972) (plurality opinion) (noting the common origins of the doctrine).
28. Id. at 762.
29. Bazyler, supra note 26, at 331.
30. Id.
31. 168 U.S. 250 (1897). The court first discussed the two doctrines together in
The Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon, 11 U.S. (Cranch) 116 (1812).
32. Id. at 252.
33. Banco Nacionale de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 416 (1964). The lan-
guage is derived from Hatch v. Baez, 14 N.Y. Supp. Ct. 596, 599 (App. Div. 1876).
Several commentators have viewed this "classic statement" as dicta since the case
turns on principles of personal and sovereign immunity. Accordingly, the case could
have been cited for the following: "The immunity of individuals from suits brought in
foreign tribunals for acts done within their own States, in the exercise of governmental
authority, whether as civil officers or as military commanders, must necessarily extend
to the agents of governments ruling by paramount force as matter of fact." Underhill v.
Hernandez, 168 U.S. at 252. See Zander, supra, note 26, at 829; Bazyler, supra note
26, at 332-33; Note: The Nonviable Act of State Doctrine. A Change in the Perception
of the Foreign Act of State, 38 U. Prrr.L. REV. 725, 726-27 (1977).
34. See Bazyler, supra note 26, at 332-33.
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the statement allowed other principles to serve as the basis for dis-
missing a suit under the doctrine; namely, the choice of law principle,
the principles of comity and, more recently, the separation of powers
principle.
Two Supreme Court cases provide support for this view. In Oetjen
v. Central Leather Company,"5 the Court was asked to determine
whether the Mexican revolutionary government had lawfully seized
certain goods. The defendant was not a government official but a pri-
vate corporation that had purchased the goods from an intermediary
who in turn had purchased them from the Mexican government. Con-
sequently, title to the goods was at issue. Ricaud v. American Metal
Company36 raised an identical issue with the exception that the party
asserting the defense was a private foreign national. In both cases the
Court refused to determine the lawfulness of the seizures because the
actions were taken in a foreign territory by a government legally recog-
nized by the United States. In Oetjen the Court rested its decision on
principles of comity; specifically, it stated that a court must show defer-
ence to the acts of foreign governments, not because they are obligated
to do so, but because it may otherwise "imperil the amicable relations
between governments and vex the peace of nations. 37 In contrast, the
Ricaud decision was based on a choice of law rationale in which the
Court held that the actions of a foreign state were binding law and
could not be questioned by courts in the United States. 8
In Bernstein v. N.V. Nederlandsche-Amerikannsche Stoomvaart-
Maatschappift9 the separation of powers doctrine became a reason for
upholding the act of state defense. This Second Circuit case involved
the confiscation of property in Germany by the Nazi government.
Faced with the act of state defense, the court at first refused to rule on
the validity of plaintiff's claim without a statement by the political
branches of government that the suit was justiciable. Only after the
State Department informed the court that it had no objection to adju-
35. 246 U.S. 297 (1918).
36. 246 U.S. 304 (1918).
37. 246 U.S. at 304.
38. Id. at 304, 309. See also Note: The Nonviable Act of State Doctrine, supra
note 33, at 727-28.
39. The litigation led to three separate decisions: Bernstein v. Van Heyghen
Freres Societe Anonyme, 163 F.2d 246 (2d Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 772
(1947); Bernstein v. N.V. Nederlandsche-Amerikannsche Stoomvaart-Maatschappij,
173 F.2d 71 (2d Cir. 1949); and Bernstein v. N.V. Nederlandsche-Amerikannsche
Stoomvaart-Maatschappij, 210 F.2d 375 (2d Cir. 1954).
40. Bernstein v. Van Heyghen Freres Societe Anonyme, 163 F.2d 246 (2d Cir.
1947).
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dication did the court proceed to determine the validity of the acts of
the German state. 1
The modern era of the doctrine emerged from a trilogy of Su-
preme Court cases that concerned the confiscation of assets by the Cu-
ban government. In Banco Nacionale de Cuba v. Sabbatino,42 the
agent for the Cuban government, Banco Nacionale, sued in a United
States court to recover proceeds from the sale of assets it claimed be-
longed to Cuba as a result of the government's nationalization of
American sugar interests in Cuba. In dealing with Cuba's title to the
sugar, the district court held that the act of state doctrine did not pro-
hibit judicial review since the confiscation violated international law;
therefore, the doctrine was inapplicable.'3 The Second Circuit affirmed
the decision but relied on the Bernstein exception, concluding that the
Executive had no objection to a decision on the merits. 4" The Supreme
Court reversed, rejecting the district court's conclusion that a violation
of international law is relevant to the doctrine's application.46 It also
expressly declined to endorse the Bernstein exception.'" Rather, the
Court held that the lack of consensus on applicable legal standards
barred the suit.4 7
The Sabbatino decision rested on the doctrine's perceived roots.
The Court found that "[w]hile historic notions of sovereign authority
do bear upon the wisdom of employing the act of state doctrine, they
do not dictate its existence."' 48 The principles of comity were not viewed
as dispositive either. 9 Instead, the doctrine had "constitutional under-
pinnings," and arose "out of the basic relationships between branches
of government in a system of separation of powers."' 50 The judiciary
therefore must refuse to act when there is an "absence of a treaty or
41. Bernstein v. N.V. Nederlandsche-Amerikannsche Stoomvaart-Maatschappij,
210 F.2d 375 (2d Cir. 1954).
42. 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
43. Banco Nacionale de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 193 F. Supp. 375, 381 (S.D.N.Y.
1961), affid on other grounds, 307 F.2d 845 (2d Cir. 1962), rev'd, 376 U.S. 398
(1964).
44. Banco Nacionale de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 307 F.2d 845 (2d Cir. 1962), rev'd,
376 U.S. 398 (1964).
45. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 428.
46. Id. at 420, 436.
47. Id. at 428.
48. Id. at 421. But see supra notes 26-38 and accompanying text.
49. Id. at 421-22. But see supra note 37 and accompanying text.
50. The court stated, however, that the Constitution did not require the act of
state doctrine and it did not remove judicial review of foreign acts of state. Sabbatino,
376 U.S. at 423.
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other unambiguous agreement regarding controlling legal principles." 51
Yet the Court expressly refused to lay down an inflexible and all-en-
compassing rule for applying the doctrine. 52 Each case must examine
all "relevant considerations.""
The second case in the trilogy, First City National Bank v. Banco
Nacionale de Cuba (Citibank)4 involved an expropriation of Citibank
branches in Cuba. When Banco Nacionale filed suit to collect the ex-
cess proceeds from Citibank's sale of assets belonging to Banco Na-
cionale, Citibank counterclaimed, seeking damages for the expropria-
tion. 58 Banco Nacionale defended using the act of state doctrine.56
The district court focused on the effect of the Hickenlooper
Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1964, 57 an amendment
which had been passed by Congress in the wake of Sabbatino. The
amendment required courts to adjudicate claims for property confis-
cated in violation of international law. 58 The court found the amend-
ment dispositive and held for Citibank. 9 The court of appeals reversed,
holding that Sabbatino controlled and that the court could not examine
the counterclaim." The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals.61
A majority of Justices agreed that the act of state doctrine did not
foreclose a decision on the merits, but a majority opinion on the under-
lying reasons could not be reached. Attention focused on a letter from
the State Department requesting that the act of state doctrine not be
applied. Justice Rehnquist's plurality opinion, joined by Chief Justice
Burger and Justice White, endorsed the Bernstein exception and held
51. Id. at 428.
52. In addressing this point the Court stated that "[t]he greater the degree of
codification or consensus concerning a particular area of international law, the more
appropriate it is for the judiciary to render decisions regarding it." Id.
53. Id.
54. 406 U.S. 759 (1972).
55. Id. at 761.
56. See generally id.
57. Pub. L. No. 88-633, Sec. 301(d)(4), 78 Stat. 1009, 1012-13 (1964), 22 U.S.C.
Sec. 2370(e)(2) (1982).
58. Id.
59. Banco Nacionale de Cuba v. First National City Bank, 270 F. Supp. 1004,
1007 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), rev'd, 431 F.2d 394 (2d Cir. 1970), vacated, 400 U.S. 1019
(1971).
60. First National City Bank, 431 F.2d 399-402. The Second Circuit issued two
separate opinions in this case. See also Banco Nacionale de Cuba v. First National
City Bank, 442 F.2d 530 (2d Cir. 1971), rev'd, 406 U.S. 759 (1972) [hereinafter
Citibank].
61. 406 U.S. at 770.
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that letter to be dispositive6 2 The act of state doctrine, according to
Rehnquist, was based on three propositions: international comity, defer-
ence to the Executive in foreign affairs, and fear of embarrassing the
Executive.6" Accordingly, when the Executive states that the doctrine's
application would not advance United States interests, the doctrine
should not be applied. 4
The majority of Justices, however, strongly criticized Rehnquist's
reliance on the Bernstein exception. Justice Douglas stated that "fair
dealing" required the suit to be heard, not the Executive's directive. 5
Justice Powell argued that the Court should hear all cases like Ci-
tibank if it would not interfere with foreign relations as Justice Rehn-
quist's opinion claimed, but agreed with Justice Douglas that the
Court, not the Executive, must make that determination. 6 Justice
Brennan's dissent, joined by Justices Stewart, Marshall and Blackmun,
criticized the Bernstein exception for its capacity to politicize judicial
functions and "bring the rule of law both here at home and in the
relations of nations into disrespect. '6 7 The dissent relied heavily on
Sabbatino and interpreted it to mean that the question of whether or
not an act of state was justiciable was in essence a "political ques-
tion." 68 In accordance with Sabbatino, the dissent favored weighing all
relevant factors before deciding if the act of state doctrine should
apply.6 9
The final case in the trilogy was Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v.
Republic of Cuba.7 0 This action was brought by former owners of sev-
eral expropriated Cuban cigar companies against Dunhill to recover
payments made by Dunhill for cigar shipments made both before and
after the property was confiscated by the Cuban government.7 1 The dis-
62. Id. at 768. The full text of the State Department's letter is appended to the
second Citibank opinion. See 442 F.2d at 536-38.
63. Citibank, 406 U.S. at 765.
64. Id. at 768.
65. Id. at 773 (Douglas, J., concurring).
66. Id. at 773-76 (Powell, J., concurring).
67. Id. at 792 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
68. Justice Brennan wrote:
[T]he absence of consensus on the applicable international rules, the unavail-
ability of standards from a treaty or other agreement, the existence and recogni-
tion of the Cuban government, the sensitivity of the issues to national concerns,
and the power of the Executive alone to effect a fair remedy for all United States
citizens who have been harmed all point to the existence of a "political question."
Id. at 787-88.
69. Id. at 788.
70. 425 U.S. 682 (1976).
71. Id. at 682-83.
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trict court denied the former owners' recovery of sums due after the
Cuban expropriation because the actions were protected by the act of
state doctrine." The court, however, held Dunhill liable for sums due
for pre-expropriation shipments since these were not protected by the
doctrine.7 Dunhill then asserted its counterclaim against certain Cu-
ban nationals who had intervened in the suit, along with Cuba, for the
money Dunhill owed. 4 The Cuban nationals defended against the
counterclaim by arguing that the situs of any debt owed Dunhill was in
Cuba, and that a refusal to repay was an act of state.75 The district
court rejected this argument and held that the situs of the debt was in
the United States, and that a refusal to honor the obligation was not an
act of state.76 The court of appeals held that the situs of the debt was
in Cuba and the act of state doctrine applied." The Supreme Court
reversed and refused to apply the doctrine.78
The Court reached a consensus on only one narrow issue: The Cu-
ban interveners had failed to meet their burden of proof and had not
established that their refusal to repay was a "public act of those with
authority to exercise sovereign powers."'79 Justice White's plurality
opinion stated that "no statute, decree, order, or resolution of the Cu-
ban government itself was offered into evidence indicating that" an act
of state had occurred.80 Justice Marshall, in dissent with Justices Bren-
nan, Stewart and Blackmun, agreed that there was insufficient evidence
that a public act was involved; however, they also concluded that a
public act need not be expressed in any particular form and that pas-
sive as well as active conduct can be an act of state.81
Two other noteworthy issues were raised. Justice White's opinion
72. Mendez v. Faber, Coe & Gregg, Inc., 345 F. Supp. 527 (S.D.N.Y. 1972),
rev'd on other grounds modified sub nom. Menendez v. Saks and Co., 485 F.2d 1355
(2d Cir. 1973), rev'd sub nom., Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba,
425 U.S. 682 (1976).
73. Id.
74. Dunhill, 425 U.S. at 682.
75. Id. The issue concerning the situs of the debt stemmed from a Second Circuit
case in which the court held that United States courts should not give effect to foreign
confiscations without compensation of property within the United States. See Republic
of Iraq v. First National City Bank, 353 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S.
1027 (1966).
76. Dunhill, 425 U.S. at 682.
77. Menendez V. Saks and Co., 485 F.2d 1355 (2d Cir. 1973).
78. Dunhill, 425 U.S. at 690.
79. Id. at 694.
80. Id. at 695. Justice White's opinion consisted of three parts, the first two of
which were joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Powell, Rehnquist and Stevens.
81. Dunhill, 425 U.S. at 719 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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held that the act of state doctrine, like the doctrine of sovereign immu-
nity, did not apply to the purely commercial acts of sovereign nations.8"
Chief Justice Burger and Justices Powell and Rehnquist agreed with
the proposition, but the majority of the Court declined to endorse a
"commercial exception.1 83 Secondly, while the State Department wrote
a letter stating that the act of state doctrine should not apply in this
case, the position of the executive branch was not discussed in the
Court's opinion, although the letter was attached as an appendix to the
decision.84 Thus, the Bernstein exception was virtually ignored by the
Court.
It is apparent that over the years the Court has become confused
about the meaning and scope of the act of state doctrine. With its roots
in personal and sovereign immunity, it has now being described as a
doctrine of conflict of law, choice of law, separation of powers, judicial
deference, and judicial restraint. Its inconsistent application has left
parties unable to predict when the doctrine will arise to prevent the
adjudication of certain claims. Moreover, the doctrine can now be used
simply to avoid deciding difficult cases, as the Marcos case seems to
suggest.
IV. ANALYSIS
In Marcos, the Second Circuit pointed to a number of weaknesses
in defendants' act of state defense. First, the court applied Dunhill and
held that defendants had failed to show that their acts were public acts
and protected under the doctrine.85 The court also questioned whether
the doctrine could even be applied in the instant case. The typical act
of state defense, the court explained, involved a foreign government de-
fending against a suit in United States courts; yet in this case, the Phil-
ippine government was the plaintiff and the principal defendant was
the former president of the country.8" The court stated that these dif-
ferences weighed against application of the doctrine, even if defendants
82. The Justice wrote "that the mere assertion of sovereignty as to a defense to a
claim arising out of purely commercial acts by a foreign is no more effective if given
the label 'Act of State' than if it is given the label 'sovereign immunity'." Id. at 705.
For the commercial exception in the Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act see 28 U.S.C.
Sec. 1605 (a)(2).
83. Rejecting the commercial exception were Justices Brennan, Stewart, Mar-
shall, Blackmun and Stevens.
84. Dunhill, 425 U.S. at 706-07.
85. Marcos, 806 F.2d at 359.
86. Id.
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could show the acts at issue were public acts.87 The burden of proof
problem, however, was the express reason why the court ignored the
thorny issues raised by the defense.88 Consequently, the court allowed
the assets of the Marcoses to be frozen.
The principal concern with Marcos is that the court ordered relief
without even a cursory evaluation of the merits of the act of state de-
fense.89 Use of the defense raises the fundamental question of whether
the suit is justiciable and can be heard by United States courts.9" Reso-
lution of that question logically precedes any court action.9" Moreover,
the form of the relief requested appears to have required some minimal
examination of the merits of the defense. Preliminary injunctive relief
presupposes that a trial will be held on the merits.92 If no trial ulti-
mately can be held because of the defense, court action would be pre-
mature notwithstanding the merits of plaintiff's claims. It initially ap-
pears, therefore, that some consideration of the act of state defense is
required. Yet both the lower court and appellate court avoided an eval-
uation of the defense before imposing judicial relief.93 This holding is
particularly troubling given that the appellate court itself expressed
concern that the act of state defense could later bar the suit.9
The court evidently believed that it need not reach the act of state
defense because defendants had failed to meet their burden of proof;
but the decision begged the questions of whether the suit ultimately
was justiciable, and whether the court should have proceeded without
some examination of the potential merits of the defense. Furthermore,
the court seemed to have gone out of its way not to treat the merits of
the defense when the criteria for issuing the preliminary injunction
raised the issue for consideration.
87. Id. See infra notes 96-105 and accompanying text.
88. Marcos, 806 F.2d at 359.
89. Beyond a discussion of the background of the act of state doctrine and its
burden of proof requirements, the court avoided further treatment.
90. A significant difference between a sovereign immunity defense and the act of
state defense is that the former deprives the court of personal jurisdiction over the suit;
the latter asserts that the details of the action cannot be questioned. See Comment,
The Jurisdictional Immunity of Foreign Sovereign, 63 YALE L.J. 1148 (1974); Com-
ment, Act of State and Sovereign Immunities Doctrine: The Need to Establish Con-
gruity, 17 U.S.F. L. REV. 91 (1982).
91. That is, if the details of the suit cannot be questioned because the suit is not
justiciable, the case will be dismissed. Any judicial action prior to dismissal would be
improper if at the outset it can be determined that the suit will likely be dismissed.
92. It C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE See. 2947
(1973).
93. See supra notes 17-25 and accompanying text.
94. New York Land Co., 634 F. Supp. at 289; Marcos, 344 F.2d at 357.
PHILIPPINES v. MARCOS
The lower court held that a preliminary injunction could be
granted if plaintiff showed "(a) irreparable harm and (b) either (1)
likelihood of success on the merits or (2) sufficiently serious questions
going to the merits to make them a fair ground for litigation and a
balance of hardships tipping decidedly toward the party requesting the
preliminary relief."9 Thus, the court's own criteria raised the question
of whether the suit would survive the defendants' challenge, criteria
that ostensibly required overlooking the burden of proof problem if cor-
rection of the problem was probable. The court, however, ignored an
evaluation of the merits and chose to employ (b)(2) instead.9"
If the court had considered the merits of the defense, the evalua-
tion could have relied on plaintiff's own characterization of the defend-
ants' acts; in effect, the complaint itself admits certain facts that could
have been used to meet the Marcoses' burden of proof. Marcos is de-
scribed in the complaint as the former President of the Philippines who
became its dictator pursuant to a declaration of martial law.97 The
complaint alleges that funds used to buy the New York properties were
illegally obtained by the commission of certain acts, such as the expro-
priation of private property, the diversion of loans intended for use by
the Philippine government, the raiding of the public treasury, and the
creation of public monopolies."
These allegations support the defendants' claim that the acts in
question "were public acts of those with authority to exercise sovereign
power." 99 Dictatorial powers under martial law arguably provide the
broadest authority under which an official may act and still remain
within the scope of his or her duties. Presumably nearly any activity
can be characterized as a public act when civil law has been suspended,
and law becomes merely an extension of the will of the person wielding
power.1"' Moreover, the activities named above could only have been
95. New York Land Co., 634 F. Supp. at 281 (quoting Jackson Dairy v. Hood,
596 F.2d 70, 72 (2d Cir. 1979)).
96. The court wrote that the "the standards for issuance of a preliminary injunc-
tion have been satisfied. Plaintiff has amply shown sufficiently serious questions going
to the merits to make them a fair ground for litigation." Id. at 290. The court of
appeals did not examine the choice of criteria. See Marcos, 344 F.2d at 352.
97. Marcos, 806 F.2d at 348.
98. Id.
99. Dunhill, 425 U.S. at 694.
100. Martial law is defined as a
system of law, obtaining only in time of actual war and growing out of the exigen-
cies thereof, arbitrary in character, and depending only on the will of the com-
mander of the army,. . and which suspends all existing civil laws, as well as the
authority and the ordinary administration of justice.
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undertaken pursuant to sovereign powers, for only through them could
the alleged activities - the expropriations, the creation of public monop-
olies and the like - be performed in the first place. To the extent that
the complaint alleges seemingly private acts, such as the receipt of
bribes and kickbacks in exchange for governmental privileges,"' the
charge that government favors were involved in any way may be
enough to characterize even these acts as public acts under martial law.
It seems unlikely, furthermore, that plaintiff could have succeeded
with an argument alleging that only lawful acts are public acts within
the meaning of the act of state doctrine. The argument was preempted,
in part, by Underhill v. Hernandez.102 The Supreme Court in that case
held that the act of state doctrine cannot "be confined to lawful or
recognized governments."' ' This point was addressed more directly by
the Second Circuit in Banco de Espana v. Federal Reserve Bank.'"
There the court held that it
make[s] no difference whether the foreign act is, under local law,
partially or wholly, technically or fundamentally, illegal. No such
distinction may be gleaned from the cases. So long as the act is the
act of a foreign sovereign, it matters not how grossly the sovereign
has transgressed its own laws. 105
Consequently, even if plaintiff could have succeeded in establishing
that the acts of Marcos were unlawful, the acts likely would have re-
mained characterized as public acts.
This reasoning suggests that the burden of proof problem in
Marcos could have been cured, and that defendants could have shown
that public acts were at issue. Had the court reached this point, it
would have been forced to assess the merits of the act of state defense
and to confront the questions raised as to the doctrine's application;
namely, whether it applied to Marcos, a former head of state, when the
Aquino government was seeking judicial relief in the United States.
The Marcos court speculated that the danger of interference with the
Executive's conduct of foreign policy probably was reduced when a cur-
rent government such as the Aquino government was a plaintiff rather
than a defendant, 0 6 an element undermining reasons to apply the doc-
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (5th ed. 1979).
101. Marcos, 344 F.2d at 348.
102. 168 U.S. 250 (1897).
103. Id. at 252.
104. 114 F.2d 438 (2d Cir. 1940).
105. Id. at 444.
106. Marcos, 344 F.2d at 359. See supra notes 23-25 and accompanying text.
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trine. The court also noted that the Supreme Court itself had raised the
question of whether the doctrine applied to those no longer in power.
1 7
Sabbatino had stated that the "balance of relevant considerations
[could be] shifted if the government which perpetrated the challenged
act of state [was] no longer in existence."108
Both of these points have certain force. If the current government
is the party bringing the action as it was in Marcos, honoring the act of
state defense could itself interfere with foreign policy goals rather than
help promote them. It is the policy of the United States to support the
Aquino government, 0 9 thus, to allow the defense would be contrary to
one of the purposes of the doctrine: to avoid interfering with the con-
duct of foreign policy. Simultaneously, denying the defense shows that
the United States honors the principles of comity that arguably also
underlie the act of state doctrine.
Yet, these arguments can be undermined as easily as new political
alliances can be formed in the Philippines. The fact that Marcos is no
longer in power or that the plaintiff was the Aquino government does
not automatically relieve judicial action against the former president of
its capacity to interfere with foreign relations. While today the United
States is a friend and supporter of the Aquino government, until 1986
the United States supported Marcos, and in the future it may be forced
to support another, quite different government than the one now in
power; specifically, one that supported or still favors the former presi-
dent. Indeed, the fragile Aquino government still contends with coup
threats from Marcos's right-wing supporters and their allies in the
armed forces.110 The Aquino government is so concerned about the
Marcoses' effect on the status quo that it refused to allow Marcos to
attend his mother's funeral while his supporters refuse to allow her bur-
ial without him in the Philippines. 1 Thus, the court's decision in
Marcos could avoid interfering in foreign policy only if the Aquino gov-
ernment remained in power, and there was no guarantee in 1986, nor is
there one in 1989, that actions against Marcos would not be considered
a diplomatic liability before the suit was resolved.
107. Id. The Washington Post reported that the Aquino government has waived
"head-of-state" immunity for Marcos with regard to the current prosecution of the
former president. Cannon & Marcus, supra note 10.
108. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 428.
109. State Dept. Bull., Dec. 1987 (statement of Gaston Sigur, Assistant Secretary
for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, before the Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific
Affairs of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Oct. 8, 1987).
110. Richburg, supra note 12.
111. Id.
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The executive branch did not state a position with regard to the
suit in Marcos,"2 although the court did refer to a letter, submitted to
the United States Court of International Trade, in which a State De-
partment official urged the Court of International Trade to proceed
with a suit by the Aquino government for the sake of United States
foreign policy interests.11 The court concluded that the letter to the
Court of International Trade implied that the action in Marcos before
the district court would not intrude into the management of foreign
affairs.11" '
In this matter too, the court's inference was unfounded and, as
recent events have shown, premature because the suit before the Court
of International Trade evidently did not involve Marcos.1 5 While it
was clear that during the Marcos suit the United States supported the
Aquino government, it did not follow that the State Department en-
dorsed judicial action against Marcos. The former president was a
long-time ally and friend of the United States and one who was
granted asylum by this country based on that friendship. Two years
after Marcos, when Marcos was indicted in New York in October of
1988, President Reagan called Marcos a friend with whom he had
"personal sympathy. 116 At that time it was also reported that the Jus-
tice Department and the State Department had been divided as to the
wisdom of prosecuting the former president.117 Officials in both depart-
ments expressed concern that actions against Marcos might establish
harmful precedents and make it more difficult to persuade dictators to
step down.' Consequently, there could have been no resolve in the
executive branch to support or endorse judicial actions in 1986 against
the former president, only months after he had been granted asylum, as
the court in Marcos suggested.
The Marcos court also failed to consider the choice of law prob-
lem, a problem that certainly confronts the current prosecution as well.
112. New York Land Co., 634 F. Supp. at 289.
113. Marcos, 344 F.2d at 357 n.3.
114. Id.
115. The court asserted that the United States had made it clear that it has no
"fear of embarrassment if the courts of this country were to take jurisdiction of this
and other disputes between" Marcos and the Philippines. Id. at 356. As for the letter to
the United States Court of International Trade, it was not appended to the court's
opinion but its contents are described in detail. There is no express indication that this
letter supported the court's claim that the State Department approved suits against
Marcos. See id. at 357 n.3.
116. Cannon & Marcus, supra note 10; Marcus, supra note 1.
117. See generally Cannon & Marcus, supra notes 10.
118. Marcus, supra note 1.
PHILIPPINES v. MARCOS
The allegations made by the grand jury and by the Philippines in
Marcos suggested that funds that were illegally obtained in the Philip-
pines were used to purchase the New York properties. Proof of those
allegations requires an inquiry into Philippine law. The competency of
the court to engage in an evaluation of foreign law is limited, as the
Supreme Court observed in Ricaud v. American Metal Co." 9 Further-
more, the court must inquire not only into the civil law of the Philip-
pines but into martial law as well, since civil law had been suspended in
1978.20 Under martial law the demarcations separating legal from ille-
gal acts are considerably blurred. The presence of controlling legal
standards in such circumstances raises serious questions as to where
they might be found, and even more compelling questions as to whether
a United States court is the appropriate forum for their considera-
tion. '2 In Sabbatino the absence of controlling legal standards was
enough to dismiss the suit. 2' The same confusion over applicable law
seemingly confronts any adjudication of the charges against Marcos in
the United States.
V. CONCLUSION
Reagan Administration officials stressed that the current indict-
ment against Marcos focused on activities allegedly committed since he
came to the United States; specifically, those taken in violation of the
federal court order that was affirmed in Marcos.2 3 In this way the
Justice Department evidently hoped to evade some of the defenses that
might be raised by the former president, but the indictment does in-
deed discuss Marcos's conduct as president; in fact, eight of the nine
racketeering charges brought by the United States involve activities
that took place in the Philippines."" "Head-of-state" immunities such
as the act of state doctrine will therefore be important to the outcome,
and the court will be asked to wade more deeply into some of the issues
that evaded the Marcos court in 1986.
The Marcos decision remains at the center of the present litiga-
tion. Had the court accepted Marcos's act of state defense, no court
order freezing the assets could have been possible. Marcos would not
119. See supra notes 36-38 and accompanying text.
120. See generally Richburg, supra note 12.
121. See supra notes 100-101 and accompanying text.
122. The implication is that martial law transforms most, if not all, acts of the
commander into public acts. See supra notes 44-46 and accompanying text.
123. Marcus, supra note 1; Cannon & Marcus, supra note 10.
124. Marcus, Marcos Case Illustrates Longer Reach of U.S. Law, Washington
Post, Oct. 26, 1988, A4, col. 5.
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now be under indictment for violating the court order which, despite
allegations of misconduct in the Philippines, is at the heart of the pre-
sent action against him.1"5 Yet, the Marcos court side-stepped the real
issues raised by the case and refused to consider the defense because
Marcos had failed to show that his acts were the public acts of a head
of state. The criteria used to issue the injunction, however, required
that the merits of the case be heard despite temporary burden-of-proof
problems. In any case, the Philippine government admitted certain
facts in their complaint and these facts established that Marcos's acts
were public acts. A decision on the act of state defense as it applied to
Marcos in 1986 was therefore warranted, and now it will be raised
again over virtually the same matters.
It is interesting to note that the Ninth Circuit dismissed a similar
suit against Marcos brought by the Philippine government when the
act of state doctrine was raised.'26 There, plaintiff sought to adjudicate
charges that Marcos had unlawfully acquired certain holdings. The
Aquino Government prayed for the return of the property and asked
for an award of $50 billion in punitive damages. 2 7 As in the suit before
the Second Circuit, the defendants in the Ninth Circuit case had not
carried their burden of proof to show that the acts were public acts. 2 '
The court, however, overlooked the problem and evaluated whether the
issues were justiciable, given the act of state doctrine.2 9 It concluded
that the suit was not justiciable and cited the difficulty that a United
States court would have in interpreting Philippine law."10 The case
portends that a similar fate may await the United States' case against
Marcos.
Victor K. Tervala
125. White House spokesman Marlin Fitzwater, in commenting on the fact that
the indictment focuses on the Marcoses' alleged activities subsequent to their arrival in
the United States, stated that "[h]ad Marcos behaved himself, he probably wouldn't
have been indicted." Marcus, supra note 1.
126. Republic of Philippines v. Marcos, 818 F.2d 1473 (9th Cir. 1987).
127. Id. at 1475.
128. Id. at 1482 n.6.
129. The court used plaintiff's own characterization of the former president's acts
to assess whether plaintiff could prevail on the merits.
130. Id. at 1490.
